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But the ambiguous judicial ratification of new legal standards for use in the "war on terrorism"
is inferior to addressing any needed changes to existing legal regimes through the treaty-making
process or, in appropriate circumstances, through domestic legislation (subject, of course, to
subsequent review by the courts for constitutionality and protection of human rights).
On a more encouraging note, the Hamdi plurality was appropriately cautious about extending legal categories created with traditional armed conflicts in mind to the broader "war on terrorism." The plurality acknowledged that "the national security underpinnings of the 'war on
terror'.., are broad and malleable," 5 and warned that its holding in Hamdi was grounded in
an "understanding [that] is based on longstanding law-of-war principles" and that "[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed
the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel."6 One may hope that if
we are unfortunate enough to see the scourge of terrorism continue, the U.S. Supreme Court's
understanding of international humanitarian law will increase over time as it becomes more
familiar with this complex, but indispensable, body of law.
JENNY S. MARTINEZ

Stanford Law School
Availability of U.S. courts to detainees at Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base-reach of habeus corpusexecutive power in war on terror
RASULV. BUSH. 124 S.Ct. 2686.

United States Supreme Court, June 28, 2004.
In Rasul v. Bush,' the U.S. Supreme Court entertained claims by aliens imprisoned at the
Guantdsnamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. The Court held that the federal habeas corpus statute
"confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the
legality of their detention" at Guantinamo Bay. 2 The Court also held that petitioners' status as
aliens held in military custody at Guantfnamo Bay did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over their non-habeas claims challenging their conditions of confinement.3
Rasul involved two separate cases that were consolidated in the district court. In Al Odah v.
United States, twelve Kuwaiti nationals sought"a declaratoryjudgment and an injunction ordering
that they be informed of any charges against them and requiring that they be permitted to consult with counsel and meet with their families."'4TheAl Odah plaintiffs dci not seek habeas corpus
relief. Indeed, they expressly "disclaim[ed] any desire to be released from confinement."' In
contrast, the petitioners in Rasul-two British and two Australian citizens 6-- filed their action
59
60

Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2641.
Id.

' 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004) [hereinafter Rasul (Supreme Court)].
2Id. at 2698.
Id. at 2698-99.
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Al Odah (circuit court )].
Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2002) [hereinafter Rasul (district court)].
'The original petitioners in Rasul were Shafiq Rasul and Asiflqbal, both citizens of the United Kingdom, and
David Hicks, an Australian citizen. See Rasul (district court), supranote 5, at 57. Later, Mamdouh Habib, an Australian citizen, filed a separate habeas petition. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2 n.2, Rasul (Supreme
Court), supra note 1. Before the Supreme Court issued its opinion, Rasul and Iqbal, the two UK citizens, were
released from U.S. custody. Rasul (Supreme Court), at 2690 n. 1. The day after the Supreme Court issued its
opinion, the government approved charges against Hicks (and two others) for trial by military commission. See
Dep't of Defense News Release, Military Commission Charges Referred (June 29, 2004). Thus, of the four
petitioners, Habib is the only one who is still being held without charge. Department of Defense news releases
for 2004 are available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004>.
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as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, requesting the court to order their release from unlawful
8
custody. 7 The Rasul petitioners also raised conditions-of-confinement claims.
The district court in Rasul held that it lacked jurisdiction over any of the claims presented
by any of the petitioners. First, it held that "a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive avenue" for petitioners to seek relief.9 In order to support this holding, the court had to read
the Rasul petition selectively, ignoring those portions of the petition that presented claims for
relief other than release from custody.' 0 Moreover, the court effectively rewrote the Al Odah
complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs "plainly challenge the lawfulness of their custody,""
even though the plaintiffs expressly disclaimed any intention to seek release from confinement.
After concluding that habeas corpus provided the exclusive avenue for relief, the district
2
court held that the Supreme Court's 1950 decision inJohnson v. Eisentrager1barredjurisdiction
over petitioners' habeas claims. Eisentragerwas a World War II case in which twenty-one German
nationals petitioned a federal district court for writs of habeas corpus. The Eisentragerpeti3
tioners had been convicted by a U.S. military commission in China of violating the laws of war.
After their trial and conviction in China, they were transferred to Landsberg prison, a U.S.
Army facility in Germany, to serve their sentences.' 4 The Supreme Court held in Eisentragerthat
the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the German. nationals' habeas petitions. In
Rasul, the district court construed Eisentragerto mean that "writs of habeas corpus are not available to aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States."'5
Petitioners had argued that "the United States has defacto sovereignty over the military base
at Guantanamo Bay, and that this provides the Court with the basis needed to assertjurisdiction."' 6The district court rejected this argument, though, emphasizing that "Guantanamo Bay
is not part of the sovereign territory of the United States." 17 As a result, the court concluded that
Rasul was indistinguishable from Eisentrager.The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed:
it construed Eisentragerto mean "that the 'privilege of litigation' does not extend to aliens in
military custody who have no presence in 'any territory over which the United States is sovereign." Therefore, the court of appeals concluded, the holding in Eisentrager"dooms (petitioners'] additional causes of action [as well], even if they deal only with conditions of confine-

ment and do not sound in habeas."' 9
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that Eisentragerdid not preclude the
district court from exercising jurisdiction over petitioners' claims. Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, identified several grounds for distinguishing between Rasul and Eisentrager.First,
0
the Rasul petitioners "are not nationals of countries at war with the United States."" In contrast,

the Eisentragerpetitioners were "alien enemies"-a term defined to mean "subject[s] of a foreign
state at war with the United States."'2 The Court's analysis in Eisentragerwas framed in terms
22
of distinctions between citizens and aliens, and between "alien friends" and "alien enemies.
Rasul (district court), supra note 5, at 57.
(noting that the Rasul petitioners asked the court, inter alia, to "order respondents to cease all interSee id.
rogations of the detained petitioners, direct or indirect, while this litigation is pending").
9Id. at 64.
Id. at 62.
'0
11Id.
12 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
13Id. at 766.
14Id.
" Rasul (district court), supra note 5, at 72-73.
'6Id.
17id.

at 69.

" Al Odah (circuit court), supra note 4, at 1144.
19Id.
20 Rasul

(Supreme Court), supra note 1,at 2693.

21Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 769 n.2.
22

See id. at 769-77.
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Under the analytic framework of Eisentrager,alien enemies receive the lowest degree of legal protection." The Court in Rasul made no attempt to justify this analytic framework, or to explain
why an individual who has engaged in hostile activities against the United States, but who happens to be a citizen of a friendly country, should receive greater legal protection than a citizen
of a hostile country who has not personally engaged in any belligerent activity.
The Court's other three grounds for distinguishing Rasul from Eisentragerwere better articulated. First, the Eisentragerpetitioners were accused of engaging in unlawful belligerent activities against the United States; they "were tried and convicted by a Military Commission...
pursuant to authority specifically granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff'; and their "sentences were
duly reviewed and ...approved by military reviewing authority." 4 In contrast, the Rasul petitioners
"deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States, '2 5 and
"they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted
of wrongdoing., 2 6 Thus, the EisentragerCourt could reasonably assume that the petitioners in
that case had engaged in hostile activities against the United States, since a duly appointed military commission had already so held. In contrast, although the government alleged in Rasul
that petitioners had engaged in belligerent actions against the United States, the Court was

unwilling to assume the truth of those allegations-precisely because petitioners had not been
charged or convicted.27
Second, the Eisentrager petitioners were tried in China and subsequently imprisoned in
Germany, "all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States." 28 Moreover,
the fact that the petitioners were outside U.S. territory was central to the Court's holding in
Eisentrager.° In contrast, the Rasul petitioners have been imprisoned for more than two years
at the Guant~namo Bay Naval Base. The United States occupies the base under the terms of a
1903 Lease Agreement, which stipulates that the U.S. "shall exercise completejurisdiction and
control over and within" the leased territory. 0 In 1934, the United States and Cuba concluded
a treaty providing that "the lease would remain in effect so long as the United States of America
shall not abandon the.., naval station ofGuantanamo. ' 3 Thus, the Court in Rasul concluded
that the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law did not restrict the application of U.S. law in Guantdnamo, because the naval base is, for all practical purposes, within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 2
2 See id. at 771-72 ("It is war that exposes the relative vulnerability of the alien's status. The security and
protection enjoyedwhile the nation of his allegiance remains in amity with the United States are greatly impaired
when his nation takes up arms against us.... But disabilities this country lays upon the alien who becomes also
an enemy are imposed temporarily as an incident of war and not as an incident of alienage.").
24 Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 766.
25 Rasul

(Supreme Court), supra note 1, at 2693.

26id.
27Justice Kennedy emphasized this point in his concurring opinion in Rasul. See id. at 2700 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).
28 Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 778.
21 See id. at 775-77 (stating that a resident enemy alien has a right of access to U.S. courts because a "lawful
residence implies protection, and a capacity to sue and be sued," but that a nonresident enemy alien "does not
have even this qualified access to our courts").
30Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, Art. III, T.S. No. 418, quoted in Rasul (Supreme Court), supra note 1, at 2690-91.
3'Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, Art. 111, 48 Stat. 1683, T.S. No. 866, quoted
inRasul (Supreme Court), supra note 1, at 2691.
3 Rasu! (Supreme Court), supra note 1,at 2696-98; see also id. at 2700 (Kennedy,J., concurring) ("Guantanamo
Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory."). In his dissenting opinion,Justice Scalia criticized the
Court's analysis in this regard. See id. at 2707-08 (Scalia, J.., dissenting). He emphasized that the original 1903
Lease Agreement between the United States and Cuba recognized "the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of
Cuba over the leased areas." Id. at 2708. ButJustice Scalia's analysis fails to account for the effect of the 1934 Treaty
Defining Relations with Cuba. By granting the United States the unilateral right to continue the lease in perpetuity,
the Treaty stripped Cuba of all rights other than nominal sovereignty over the leased territory. In contrast, immediately after World War II, the Landsberg prison in Germany, where the Eisentragerpetitioners were detained,
was subject to the "supreme authority" of the Allied Powers. See Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany
and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany, U.S.-USSR-UK-Fr.,June 5, 1945, 60 Stat.
1649, TIAS 1520. By the time that the Supreme Court decided Eisentrager,though, the Allied Powers had trans-
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Finally, the Court reasoned that Rasul was distinguishable from Eisentragerbecause Supreme
33
Court decisions after Eisentragerhad "overruled the statutory predicate to Eisentrager'sholding."
At issue was the federal habeas corpus statute granting federal district courts authority to entertain habeas petitions "within their respective jurisdictions" 3 4-statutory language that has not
changed since the time that Eisentragerwas decided. The district court in Eisentragerconstrued
this statutory phrase, in accordance with Supreme Court precedent controlling at that time, to
mean that district courts lackjurisdiction over habeas petitions unless petitioners are physically
35
present within the territory where the district court is located. Accordingly, the district court
dismissed the habeas petition for lack of statutory jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit in Eisentrager
reversed the district court judgment-not because the district court had misinterpreted the
statute, but because the Constitution itself secured for petitioners a right of access to U.S.
courts.3 6 The Supreme Court in Eisentragerthen reversed the court of appeals on constitutional

37
grounds, holding that the Constitution did not grant petitioners a right of access to U.S. courts.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Eisentragerdid not decide the correct interpretation of the federal
habeas statute.3 s
In 1973, more than twenty years after its decision in Eisentrager,the Supreme Court revisited
the question of how best to interpret the statutory phrase "within their respectivejurisdictions."
In Braden v. 30thJudicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that this statutory
language did not require petitioners to be physically present within the territory where the
district court is located. 39 Thus, the majority in Rasul concluded that it did not need to address
the constitutional question at issue in Eisentrager.According to the Rasul majority, the federal
habeas corpus statute, as construed in Braden, granted the district court statutoryjurisdiction over40
the detainees' habeas petition "as long as 'the custodian can be reached by service of process.'

ferred substantial authority to Germany and promised that "the exercise of direct powers by the Allies should be
regarded as temporary and self-liquidating in nature." Agreed Memorandum Regarding the Principles Governing Exercise of Powers and Responsibilities of US-U K-French Governments Following Establishment of German
Federal Republic, April 8, 1949, Art. 3, 63 Stat. 2817, TIAS 2066. Thus, a key distinction between Guanthnamo
Bay and the Landsberg prison is that Cuba has granted the U.S.jurisdiction over Guantinamo Bay in perpetuity.
" Rasul (Supreme Court), supra note 1, at 2695.
14 28 U.S.C. §2241(a) (2000).
" The district court opinion in Eisentrageris unpublished. According to the D.C. Circuit, the district court dismissed the petition "upon the authority of Ahrens v. Clark." Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 962 (D.C.
Cir. 1949). Ahrens held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that "the presence within the territorial jurisdiction
of the District Court of the person detained is prerequisite to filing a petition for a writ of habeascorpus." Ahrens v.
Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 189 (1948).
3 See Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d at 963-65.
37See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777 ("We are here confronted with a decision whose basic premise
is that these prisoners are entitled, as a constitutionalright, to sue in some court of the United States for a writ of
habeas corpus") (first emphasis added).
3
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Rasul, contested this interpretation of Eisentrager.See Rasul (Supreme
Court), supra note 1, at 2701-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He contended that the court of appeals decided Eisentrager
on statutory grounds, not constitutional grounds. Id. at 2702. In fact, the court of appeals in Eisentragerfocused
primarily on petitioners' constitutional right to habeas corpus. See 174 F.2d at 963-65. Justice Scalia claimed,
however, that the court employed constitutional analysis in support of its statutory holding, invoking the canon
of constitutional avoidance to support a statutory interpretation that would avoid constitutional difficulties. See
Rasul (Supreme Court), supra note 1, at 2702 (Scalia,J., dissenting). Admittedly, there is some language in the court
of appeals' decision in Eisentragerthat supports Justice Scalia's interpretation. Regardless, the Supreme Court
in Eisentragerconstrued the lower court's decision as a constitutional decision, not a statutory decision. See 339 U.S.
at 767 (stating that the court of appeals concluded that "although no statutory jurisdiction of such cases is given,
courts must be held to possess it as part of the judicial power of the United States"), 781 (stating that the court of
appeals "gave our Constitution an extraterritorial application"), 784 ("The decision belowwould extend coverage
of our Constitution to nonresident alien enemies"). Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Eisentragerbased its own
decision on constitutional grounds, not statutory grounds. See id. at 770-76 (explaining how the constitutional rights
accorded to aliens hinge on distinctions between residents and nonresidents, and between friends and enemies),
777-81 (rejecting the claim that an enemy alien outside the United States is constitutionally entitled to the writ
of habeas corpus).
0 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973).
4
oRasul (Supreme Court), supranote 1, at 2695 (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95). Justice Scalia criticized
the majority opinion as follows: "From this point forward, federal courts will entertain petitions from ... prisoners.., around the world, challenging actions and events far away, and forcing the courts to oversee one aspect
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After concluding that the district court had jurisdiction over the Rasul petitioners' habeas
corpus claims, the Supreme Court addressed their non-habeas claims. 4' The Court explicitly
cited both the federal question statute 42 and the Alien Tort Statute43 as potential grounds for
jurisdiction. The Court did not actually hold, however, that these statutes grant the district
courtjurisdiction over petitioners' non-habeas claims. Rather, it held only that Eisentragerdoes
not bar jurisdiction over such claims,44 leaving it for the district court to resolve any other
jurisdictional objections on remand. In order for the district court to exercise jurisdiction
under either the Alien Tort Statute45 or the federal question statute, 46 it must find that some
federal law grants petitioners a private cause of action for their non-habeas claims. Therefore,
the Rasul petitioners have the burden of establishing a private right of action if they wish to
pursue their non-habeas claims under the jurisdictional grant of either the Alien Tort Statute
or the federal question statute.47

One week after the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul, the administration issued an order
establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs). 4s The CSRTs' mandate is to review
the available factual information for each of the individuals currently detained at Guantdsnamo
Bay in order to ascertain, in each case, whether the individual qualifies as an "enemy combat'
ant. 49
The order defines the term "enemy combatant" to include "an individual who was part
of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners."50 The CSRTs issued their first decisions on
of the Executive's conduct of a foreign war." Id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Since the time that the Supreme
Court decided Rasul, the parents ofAhmed Abu Ali-an individual with alleged ties to A] Qaeda who is currently
detained in Saudi Arabia-have filed a habeas corpus petition in a U.S. federal court. See Carlyle Murphy, Saudis
Plan TerrorCase Against Virginia Man, Family Says, WASH. PosT., July 30, 2004, at A9. If the court asserts jurisdiction
in that case, Justice Scalia's prediction may prove to be right. But courts might also reasonably conclude that Guanthnamo Bay is a special case and that the holding in Rasul does not extend to prisoners detained in other parts
of the world. If that is the correct interpretation of Rasul, then the ultimate lesson for the executive branch may
be that it can evade the jurisdiction of U.S. courts by holding prisoners in Iraq or Afghanistan, instead of transferring them to Guanthnamo Bay.
" Rasul (Supreme Court), supra note 1, at 2698-99.
4' 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (granting federal district courtsjurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
4' 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (granting federal district courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States").
4' Rasul (Supreme Court), supra note 1, 2698-99.
15 Several lower courts have held that the Alien Tort Statute creates a federal cause of action for claims like the
non-habeas claims at issue in Rasul. The Supreme Court held explicitly in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739
(2004), see Brad Roth, Case Report: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain; United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 98 AJIL 798 (2004),
decided one day after Rasul, that the Alien Tort Statute does not create a private cause of action. Id. at 2761. The
Court also held, though, that federal courts have the power to create a federal common law cause of action for certain violations of international law. Id. at 2764-65. Thus, Sosa might reasonably be construed to authorizejudicial
creation of a federal common law cause of action for some of the international law claims advanced by petitioners
Rasul.
in 46
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICI1ON 279-80 (3rd ed. 1999) (federal question statute confers
jurisdiction on federal district courts to entertain claims in which federal statute creates private right of action).
47 See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the PresidentBound by the Geneva Conventions? 90 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (contending that the Administrative Procedure Act creates a private right of action that authorizes
suit by the detainees to enjoin the continued use of interrogation methods that violate the Geneva Conventions).
48 See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy (July 7,
2004) ("Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal"), at < http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d2004O707review.pdf> [hereinafter CSRT Order]:
" See id; see also Memorandum of Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy (July 29, 2004) ("Implementation
of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,
Cuba"),
at < http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf>.
0
5 CSRT Order, supranote 48, para. a. The order adds that the term "includes any person who has committed
a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." Id. The broader language
quoted above seems purposefully designed, however, to allow an individual to be designated an "enemy combatant" simply by virtue of association with Al Qaeda, even if that individual did not directly support hostilities.
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5
August 13, 2004, ruling that four detainees had been properly classified as enemy combatants. '
The administration plans to release any individuals whom the CSRTs determine are not enemy
combatants;52 it claims the authority to detain enemy combatants indefinitely.
In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul, individuals deemed by the CSRTs
to be enemy combatants have a right to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court to
challenge the lawfulness of their detention. In addressing such claims, courts will need to determine what rule of law to apply in evaluating the status of the detainees. The position presented
in this comment is that the Geneva Conventions provide the appropriate legal rules for the
courts to apply.53 In applying the Conventions, it is not necessary for the courts to decide whether
the detainees are "enemy combatants," as defined by the administration, because the administration's definitions do not conform to the legal framework of the Conventions. "
55
The Senate consented to ratification of the Geneva Conventions on July 6, 1955. The United
States ratified the treaties on July 14, 1955. Under the express terms of the Constitution, the
Conventions are "the supreme Law of the Land." 56 Thus, as a matter of domestic law, the Conventions supersede any prior conflicting treaties, statutes, and common law rules governing the
5
treatment ofwartime detainees. 57 Moreover, since treaties are equivalent to statutes, and since
9
statutes trump conflicting regulations, including those enacted later in time, it follows that the
Geneva Conventions take precedence over any subsequently enacted regulations that conflict
with them. 60 Therefore, insofar as the government's classification of the detainees as "enemy
combatants" relies on legal rules that antedate U.S. ratification of the Geneva Conventions, or
6
on regulations promulgated without express statutory authorization, ' the courts are bound to

5'Adam Liptak, In FirstRulings, Military Tribunals Uphold Detentions of 4, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2004, at Al 1.
As of October 1, the CSRTs had completed hearings for 115 detainees. See Kathleen T. Rhem, Annual Reviews of
Detainee Cases to Begin at Guantanamo,AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERvICE, at <www.defenselink.milnews/Oct2004>.
In one of those cases, the tribunal nded that the detainee was not properly classified as an enemy combatant. See id.
12 CSRT Order, supra note 48, para. i.
" Geneva Convention [No. 1)for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3114, 75 UNTS 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
[No. Il] for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3217, 75 UNTS 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
[No. III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3316, 75 UNTS 135 [hereinafter
Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
5' Clearly, the courts owe deference to the factual findings that support the CSRTs' designation of an individual
as an "enemy combatant." Nevertheless, the conclusion that a particular individual is an "enemy combatant" is
a legal one. Therefore, since the CSRTs are made up primarily of military officers who are not lawyers, the courts
should not defer to the tribunals' legal conclusions. See CSRT Order, supra note 48, para. (e) ("A Tribunal shall be
composed of three neutral commissioned officers of the U.S. Armed Forces .... One of the members shall be
a judge advocate.")
5 84 Cong. Rec. 9958, 9972-73 (1955).
56U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
57See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWOFTHE UNITED STATES § 115(2) (1987) ("A provision of a treaty of the United States that becomes effective as law of the United States supersedes as domestic
law any inconsistent preexisting provision of a law or treaty of the United States.").
58 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-02 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
193-95 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884).
5
See, e.g., Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (invalidating FDA regulations that conflicted with Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); MCI Telecomm. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
512 U.S. 218 (1994) (invalidating FCC rule that conflicted with Federal Communications Act); City of Chicago
v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994) (invalidating EPA rule that conflicted with Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act).
' For ftiller development of this argument, see Jinks & Sloss, supra note 47. If a later regulation is promulgated
on the basis of an express grant of statutory authority, and if the statute authorizes regulations inconsistent with
a prior treaty, then the regulation would arguably trump the treaty. None of the administration regulations concerning the Guantdinamo Bay detainees is supported, however, by a statute authorizing regulations inconsistent
with the Geneva Conventions. See id.
" The government's classification scheme is based primarily on an executive order adopted by President Bush.
See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833
(2001) [hereinafter November 2001 Military Order]. That executive order, in turn, invokes the following sources
of statutory authority: Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (authorizing the president "to use all
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apply the legal rules codified in the Conventions, rather than the legal framework set forth in
recent executive orders, in the event of a conflict between the two.
The government contends that federal courts are not authorized to apply the Geneva Conventions since they are not self-executing. 62 In support of this claim, the government cites several cases in which courts have asserted that the Conventions do not create a private cause of
action. 6 3 However, for the purpose of habeas corpus petitions in which petitioners assert rights
under the Geneva Conventions, it is immaterial whether the Conventions create a private cause
of action; the federal habeas statute provides an express private right of action for petitioners
who allege that they are in "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 4 Therefore, even assuming that the Conventions are not self-executing-in the
sense that they do not create private rights of action-they are still judicially enforceable,
because they are the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause,6 5 and the federal habeas statute
expressly authorizes private enforcement of treaties that have the status of supreme federal law.66
The Geneva Conventions provide substantial support for claims challenging the validity of the
military commissions established pursuant to President Bush's November 2001 military order,67
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,2001"); 10 U.S.C. §821 (2000)
(addressing the jurisdiction of military commissions); and 10 U.S.C. §836 (2000) (authorizing the president to
prescribe rules for trials by military commissions). None of those statutes authorize the president, explicitly or implicitly, to promulgate rules inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions. SeeJinks & Sloss, supra note 47. Therefore,
regulations enacted pursuant to the November 2001 Military Order lack statutory authorization insofar as those
regulations conflict with the Geneva Conventions.
62 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-motion to Dismiss at 29-33 (Aug. 6, 2004), Swift v.
Runsfeld (W.D. Wash.) (No. CV04-0777), at <www.nimj.com>.
63See id. (citing, inter alia, Hamdi v. Runsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468-69 (4th Cir. 2003), Al Odah v. United States,
321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring), Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)). The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hamdi,
124 S.Ct. 2633, the same day as Rasul. Hamdi is discussed ina case report by Jenny S. Martinez at 98 AJIL 782
(2004).
" 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
15 Only three published judicial decisions have explicitly addressed the status of the Geneva
Conventions under
the Supremacy Clause; all three agree that the Conventions are the law of the land. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v.
Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp.2d 541, 553-54 (E.D. Va.
2002); United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 794 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
6This statement requires two caveats. First, the Conventions differ from some treaties in that they are manifestly intended to create primary rights for individuals. Treaties that create only horizontal duties between states,
rather than vertical duties owed by states to individuals, do not create primary rights for individuals and are therefore notjudicially enforceable at the behest of private individuals. See, e.g., Edye v.Robertson (Head Money Cases),
112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (distinguishing between treaties that are "primarily... compact[s] between independent
nations" and treaties that "confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the
territorial limits of the other").
Second, in consenting to ratification of a particular treaty, the Senate could presumably adopt a condition to
exempt that treaty from the general application of the federal habeas corpus statute. One could argue that recent
non-self-executing declarations attached to human rights treaties have that effect. The Senate did not adopt any
such condition, however, when it consented to ratification of the Geneva Conventions. There is also no evidence
in the Senate record associated with ratification of the Conventions that the Senate intended to exempt the Conventions friom the general application of the habeas statute.
67
November 2001 Military Order, supranote 61. Among other things, the military order authorized the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations for trials before military commissions. As of Jtly 2004, the president had
determined that fifteen detainees were eligible for trial by military commission pursuant to the military order.
See Dep't of Defense News Release, Presidential Military OrderApplied to Nine More Combatants (July 7, 2004).
As of this writing, charges have been filed against only four detainees. See Dept' of Defense News Release, Military
Commission Charges Referred (June 29, 2004) (naming three individuals who have been charged); Dep't of
Defense News Release, Additional Military Commission Charges Referred (July 14, 2004) (naming one additional
defendant). The Navy officer assigned to represent Salim Abmad Hamdan, one of the detainees who has been
charged, has filed a petition in federal court challenging the validity of the military commissions. See Petition for
Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1361 or, in the Alternative, Writ of Habeas Corpus (Apr. 6, 2004), Swift
v. Rumsfeld (W.D. Wash.) (CV04-0777), at <http://www.nimj.com>.
There is already a sizable literature analyzing the validity of the military commissions. See, e.g., Laura Dickinson,
Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, InternationalTribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002); Neal Kumar Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, DecidingGuilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE LJ. 1259 (2002); Daryl A. Mundis, The Use ofMilitary Commissions to ProsecuteIndividualsAccused
of TerroristActs, 96 AJIL 320 (2002);Jordan Paust,Antiterrorism Military Commissions: CourtingIllegality, 23 MICH.
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and also for claims challenging the conditions of confinement at Guantfinamo Bay. 68 The Conventions provide very little support, however, for the Guantinamo detainees' claims asserting
a right to be released from custody. In order to clarify this point, it is helpful to review the
debate about the detainees' status under the Geneva Conventions.
The administration divides the detainees into two categories: Taliban detainees and Al Qaeda
detainees. 6 The administration claims that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda since Al Qaeda is not a state party to the Conventions.7" The administration concedes that the Geneva Conventions apply to the armed conflict
between the United States and the Taliban. It maintains, however, that the Taliban detainees
are not protected by the Third Geneva Convention (protecting prisoners of war (POWS)) since
they are unlawful combatants."' In addition, the administration contends "that common Article 3
of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because.., the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to 'armed conflict not of an
international character."' 72
The administration's analysis is seriously flawed. Under the scheme of the Conventions, there
are two types of armed conflicts: international and non-international. The bulk of the Conventions apply to international armed conflicts-that is, conflicts between states. 73 Common Article 3
applies to "armed conflict not of an international character" 74-that is, conflicts that are not
7
between states. The latter category includes conflicts between a state and a nonstate entity.
Thus, insofar as individual Al Qaeda members were fighting in support of the Taliban in the
conflict between the United States and Afghanistan, they are protected by Convention provisions
that address international armed conflicts.76 Insofar as individual Al Qaeda members were not
aligned with any state, they are protected by common Article 3. The administration's positionthat the conflict with Al Qaeda is neither international nor non-international-is utterly without
foundation.
As noted above, the administration contends that the Conventions apply to the U.S. conflict
with the Taliban, but that the Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs. Assuming for the sake
of argument that the administration is correct in this regard, 7 the inescapable conclusion is
L. 1 (2001). For a thorough analysis of conflicts between the military commission regulations and U.S.
obligations under the Geneva Conventions, see Douglass Cassel & Bridget Arimond, ViolationsofInternationalHuman
Rights and HumanitarianLaw Arisingfrom Proposed Trials Before United States Military Commissions (2004) (on file
with author).
68 See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 47 (contending that the interrogation methods employed by the government
at Guantinamo Bay violate detainees' rights under the Geneva Conventions).
69See Memorandum from George W. Bush, President, to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the Attorney General, and Other Officials (Feb. 7,2002) ("Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees") [hereinafter, Bush memorandum]. Many of the U.S. government memoranda concerning the treatment
of detainees can be found on the Web site of Georgetown University's online National Security Archive, < http://
www.gwu.edu/-nsarchi/NSAEBB/NSAEBB
127/index.htm> [hereinafter Georgetown University archive].
70
Id., para. 2(a).
71Id., para. 2(d). For Third Geneva Convention, see supra note 53.
72 Bush memorandum, supra note 69, para. 2(c).
71See Geneva Conventions, supra note 53, common Article 2 (stating that the Conventions "apply to all cases
of... armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of them"). Currently, there are 191 states parties to the Conventions. See Int'l Comm.
of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 andAdditional Protocolsof 8June 1977: Ratifications,Accessions
and Successions, at <http://wvww.icrc.org/eng/partygc> (documenting 191 ratifications as of October 2004). Thus,
under common Article 2, the Conventions apply to almost every armed conflict between states.
" Geneva Conventions, supra note 53, common Article 3.
75See DerekJinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 38-41 (2003).
7
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 53, Art. 4(A)(2) (granting POW protections to members of militias
and volunteer corps who are not members of the armed forces of a party); see alsoJEAN DE PREUX, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR: COMMENTARY 57 (Jean S. Pictet gen. ed., A. P.
de Heney trans., 1960) (noting that militias other than the armed forces of a party "must be fighting on behalf of
a Party to the conflict in the sense of Article 2, otherwise the provisions of Article 3 relating to non-international
conflicts
are applicable").
77
The merits of the government's position turn on the interpretation of Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention, supranote 53. Article 4(A)(1) states that "[m]embers of the armed forces of a party to the conflict" qualify
J. INT'L
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that the Taliban detainees are protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies to
"those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a
'
conflict ....in the hands of a Party to the conflict... of which they are not nationals." In its
internal deliberations on these issues, the administration did not address the application of the
Fourth Convention to the Taliban detainees,7 9 apparently because administration lawyers assumed
that the Convention applies only to "civilian non-combatants.",o That assumption is mistaken for
two reasons."' First, the Fourth Convention specifies only three exceptions to the broad language
82
quoted above, and there is no exception for combatants. Second, the Convention includes a
specific provision to address individual civilians who are "suspected of or engaged in activities
hostile to the security of the State.""5 Although such individuals may be denied "rights of communication" under the Fourth Convention, 4 in all other respects they are entitled to the same
rights as civilian noncombatants.
In sum, the Taliban detainees are protected either by the Third or Fourth Geneva Convention, depending upon whether they qualify as lawful combatants. The Al Qaeda detainees are
protected either by the Fourth Convention or common Article 3, depending upon whether they
s5
were fighting on the side of the Taliban in Afghanistan. None of the detainees is bereft of legal
rights under the Geneva Conventions. However, the Conventions strike a balance between the
as POWs. Hence, the Taliban detainees arguably qualify as POWs under this provision. Article 4(A)(2) states,
however, that "[m]embers of other militias and members of other volunteer corps" must satisfy four criteria in
order to qualify as POWs: "(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of
having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs ofwar." The administration claims that the Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs because they fail to satisfy the conditions in Article 4(A)(2). See, e.g., Memorandum
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Feb. 7, 2002)
("Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949"), at Georgetown University
archive, supra note 69. However, individuals who are "members of the armed forces of a Party" under Article
4(A)(1) arguably qualify as POWs regardless of whether they satisfy the four criteria in Article 4(A)(2). See, e.g.,
George H. Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AJIL 764, 768-69 (1981). Since many of the Taliban detainees
were apparently members of the armed forces of Afghanistan, they can make a strong case that they are entitled
to POW status.
7'Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 53, Art. 4.
7
OnJune 22, 2004, the administration declassified a large volume of documents that shed light on the internal deliberations resulting in the president's decision regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions to
the Guantdnamo Bay detainees. See Press Briefing by White House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales (June 22,
2004) (discussing the declassified documents), at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004 >. Some of the
key documents are discussed in Sean A. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 98 AJIL 820
(2004). Remarkably, in all of these documents, there is not even a single sentence discussing the application of
Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Taliban detainees. As noted previously, many of these documents
can be found online at the Georgetown University archive, supra note 69.
s"See White House Fact Sheet: Status of Detaineesat Guantanamo(Feb. 7, 2002) (stating that the Fourth Geneva
interned or otherwise found in the hands of a party"),
Convention applies to "civilian non-combatants who 2are
0 02 02 7
0 -13.html>. The White House issued the fact sheet
at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/
on the same day that President Bush rendered his decision about the status of the detainees under the Geneva Conventions. As suggested in the preceding footnote, the declassified documents do not contain any legal analysis
supporting the claim that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies only to noncombatants.
"' For a more detailed explanation of the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to unlawful combatants,
see Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARv. INT'L L.J. 367, 381-97 (2004).
" The three exceptions are set forth in Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 53. First, persons
protected by one of the other three Geneva Conventions are not protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Under the administration's position, the Taliban detainees do not fit within this exception since they are ostensibly
not protected under the Third Geneva Convention. Second, "Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it." Assuming that the Taliban detainees are nationals of Afghanistan, they do not fit
within this exception because Afghanistan is a party to the Convention. Third, "Nationals of a neutral State who
find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded
as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State
in whose hands they are." Again assuming that the Taliban detainees are Afghan nationals, this exception does not
apply since they are not nationals of either a neutral state or a co-belligerent state. To the contrary, in the context
of the international armed conflict between the United States and Afghanistan, they are nationals of an enemy state.
884 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 53, Art. 5.
1d.
'5 This statement assumes that the Al Qaeda detainees do not qualify as POWs since they do not satisfy the
four criteria set forth in Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. See supra note 77.
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rights of detainees and the powers of government. Just as the detainees' legal rights limit the
lawful authority of the government, so, too, does the government's legal authority limit the rights
of the detainees. Thus, while the Geneva Conventions codify the legal rights of the prisoners
in relation to the government, they also codify a set of rules that authorize the government to
detain the prisoners.
The Third Convention expressly grants the government the authority to detain POWs until
"the cessation of active hostilities. '86 The executive branch maintains that active hostilities are
ongoing. Under current circumstances, there is no basis for a court to second-guess the government on this matter. Therefore, the government has the legal authority to maintain custody for
the foreseeable future over any detainees who qualify as POWs, and there is no obligation to
file criminal charges against POWs in order to justify their continued detention.
Similarly, the Fourth Convention authorizes the internment of protected persons "if the
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary." 8'7 Moreover, the government
is authorized to detain an individual protected by the Fourth Convention until "the reasons
which necessitated his internment no longer exist"S-though "[i]nternment shall cease as soon
as possible after the close of hostilities. 9With respect to detainees who qualify as protected persons under the Fourth Convention, habeas corpus provides a mechanism forjudicial review of
the executive branch's determinations that detention of an individual is "absolutely necessary"
for U.S. security and that "the reasons which necessitated his internment" still exist. Suchjudicial review will necessarily be highly deferential, however, to executive branch claims regarding
the threat that a particular individual poses to U.S. national security. Therefore, detainees who
qualify as protected persons under the Fourth Convention are unlikely to win release from custody by means of a habeas corpus petition-at least not while the United States is engaged in
active hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq.
As noted above, A] Qaeda detainees who were not fighting on the side of the Taliban in Afghanistan are protected only by common Article 3 since they were not involved in an international
armed conflict. Common Article 3 does not expressly grant the government authority to detain
individuals who are captured during a non-international armed conflict, nor does it constrain
the government's authority to do so. Accordingly, from the standpoint of international law, the
government's authority to detain such individuals is governed by customary international law.
Moreover, from the standpoint of domestic constitutional law, the president, as commander-inchief, has the authority to detain combatants in a non-international armed conflict in accordance with the customary laws ofwar. The contours of the customary rules governing detention
of such combatants are not entirely clear, but the government can make a strong case that it
has the authority to detain the combatants until the cessation of active hostilities. Therefore,
although individuals protected only by common Article 3 have a right to petition for habeas
corpus relief, the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul indicates that they are unlikely to win release
from custody unless they can demonstrate that they did not engage in belligerent activities
against the United States.90
In sum, the Bush administration invokes the law of war as a source of legal authority for the
government to maintain custody over the Guantinamo detainees,9' while simultaneously denying
86Third Geneva Convention, supra note 53, Art. 118.
87 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 53, Art. 42.
s81 d., Art. 132.
s9 Id,,
Art. 133; see also id., Art. 5 ("Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict ....an individual protected
person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised
in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State.").
9
There may be some Al Qaeda detainees protected only by common Article 3 who satisfy the administration's
definition of "enemy combatant" but who did not engage in belligerent activities against the United States. Seesupra
note 50. In such cases, courts should directly address the question whether continued detention is consistentwith
the customary laws of war.
91 See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Remarks Before the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Law and National Security (Feb. 24, 2004), reprintedin 150 CONG. REC. S2701-05 (Mar. 11, 2004).
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that the detainees have any legal rights under the Geneva Conventions. That position is untenable. The government's argument in support of its asserted authority relies almost exclusively
on judicial decisions, such as Ex parte Quirin,92 that antedate U.S. ratification of the Geneva
Conventions. Quirin and other law-of-war cases applied customary international law-of-war
rules as a form of federal common law. In terms of international law, the old customary rules
have been superseded in all relevant respects by the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, in terms of
domestic law, the federal common law rules have been superseded by the Geneva Conven93
tions-at least insofar as there is a conflict between the two sets of rules. Therefore, the law of
war that applies to the detainees is the law codified in the Geneva Conventions. The government
cannot have its cake and eat it too. Insofar as the government invokes the law of war as a source of
94
legal authority, it must acknowledge that the Geneva Conventions also constrain that authority.
DAVID L. SLOSS

St. Louis University School of Law
Scope ofAlien Tort Statute-arbitraryarrest and detention as violations of custom
SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN; UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN.

124 S.Ct. 2739.

United States Supreme Court, June 29, 2004.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain' ends another chapter of the
long-running legal saga arising out of the 1990 U.S. government-sponsored abduction of a
Mexican national, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, and his forcible transfer to the United States
in order to stand trial, over Mexico's objections, on charges relating to the 1985 murder in
Mexico of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar. Although the
stage was initially set for a second and more exhaustive Supreme Court examination of the pro2
prieties of the extraterritorial seizure, detention, and transfer of Alvarez, these issues became
overshadowed by questions about the continued viability of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)3 as a
vehicle for international human rights lawsuits, notwithstanding a generation of human rights
litigation following the landmark 1980 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Fildrtigav. Peha-Irala. In Sosa, the Supreme Court sufficiently circumscribed the legacy of the

Fildrtigaline of cases to doom Alvarez's ATS claim, but it generally left the door open to ATSbased human rights lawsuits. The precise dimensions of the opening left by this decision will
undoubtedly be controverted for some time to come.
In its first treatment of the Alvarez abduction in 1992, the Supreme Court held that the forcible
seizure and transfer, whether or not a violation of customary international law, did not violate
the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty and therefore did not affect the federal court's jurisdiction
over Alvarez for purposes of the criminal trial.' At the subsequent trial, the district court granted
Alvarez ajudgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the prosecution's case, holding that the evi6
dence adduced was insufficient to support a guilty verdict.
U.S. 1 (1942).
93 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
92317

'Justice Souter made a similar point in his separate opinion in the Hamdi case. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633, 2657-59 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
'124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
2In 1992, the Supreme Court addressed these issues-also with regard to the abduction of Alvarez-in United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
28 U.S.C. §1350 (2000).
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992).
6 According to the Ninth Circuit, "The [district] court concluded that the case against Alvarez was based on
'suspicion and hunches but... no proof,' and that the government's theories were 'whole cloth, the wildest speculation."' Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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